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'l'HE
Homicide-Evidence-Other Crimes.-Where
of
ceased
"whole
missible
offense.
Error - Instructions.-In murder
evidence of
purwas familiar with means
to have been used in commission of crime
and
that he possessed knowledge that
have been useful in
commission of sueh crime, but that
could not consider
such evidence where other offense involved was a "later ofwas not prejudicial,
assault occurred a few
seconds after defendant shot
where defendant admitted on witness stand
shot which killed deceased and that he was
familiar with manner of
operating gun.
[3] Criminal Law-Trial-Objection to and Striking Out Evidence.
-Mere
of
to
asked defendant as
to what caused scar on his head does not eliminate his answer
to question in absence of any
strike such answer.
[ 4] !d.-Appeal-Harmless
to Evidence.
-Defendant was not
to
question asked him as to what caused scar on
where
materiality or
of such question
and where his counsel did not
to
be

343

Indians~Jurisdiction.-~FJvidcnce

that dcfend"Indians" shows
that they
and that fact alone is infederal government Pxclusive
committed in Indian
b(~canse such jurisdietion do('S not exist when crime involves Indians who have
mr1 "'''"r~ as, for
severing
habits or by receiving
patent in fee from federal
Indians-Jurisdiction.-An Indian who has beis to be treated like non-Indian for purposes
case, and state courts have jurisan Indian
where non-Indian
anotlwr non-Indian in Indian country.
26 Cal.App.2d 618, 622-623,
Indians- Jurisdiction.--Doeuments entitled
insuffieient to
murder ease within
to federal jurisdiction over
Indians in Indian country
def(mdant and victim of murder
relates
to race and
whether they
.imris•dic:ticm or were
Criminal Law-Appeal-Reduction of Punishment Imposed.of
('rror, death
in a
ease eannot be reduced on
Cal.Jur., Indians, § 3; Am.Jur., Indians, §50 et seq.

C. J.-A
further consideration to the question
evidenee on
in death
cases. F'or reasons hereinafter stated we have concluded that it may not be so received.
'l'he defendant
not guilty and not guilty by reason
of
to a
of the murder of Wilbur McSwain.
guilty of first
murder, without
aJHl another found him sane. 'l'he judgment senteneed him io death, antl tl1e cat->c is here on automatic
'rherc was no motion for a new trial.
'!'be defendant was
iried on the same charge
and found
of murder. At that trial he was also found
under a second
of assault with intent to murder
Alvin McSwain, the brother of ·wilbur. On appeal this court
reversed the
of conviction of murder for refusal
instruetious and because of the giving
instructions
fi
murdee, but tlw
conviction on the seeond count 1vas affirmed.
36 CaL2d 76R [ 228 P.2d 281J.)
'rlw evidence at the second trial was snhstantially the same
as at the first. Briefly summarized il show;; that on the t)\'e22, 1
the defendant dnwe JJis (;ar to a
dance at Yosemite Fori's in }ladera
Riding with
him were l<Jlla
·wilbur 1\leSwain,
Davi::>
and
CheiJOL Alvin ::\IeSwain was also at the dance.
After the l1anee many of those
the above
mentionrd persons, went to a place known as Kilroy's I1ast
Stand, where soft drinks and sandwiches were sold. An
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in which Alvin

llU'UHJl!:)

Chenot

nO

After 13 or 20 minutes he heard
it. J n the front sE'at of the
and Yrilbnr
and in the back seat were
Davis and Alvin JVIeS>vain. The (1efem1ant said
to kill all of them
Donnell, and he fired
'Wilbur who was then
tile front
the other side of the car. He then walked to1Yard the back
the ear and fired three shots into the back
tbree wounds on Al'dn. Immediately afterwards he was disclrmed. \Yilbur died from his wound several hours later.
The sceond trial was solely for the murder of
and
defendant urges that it was error to admit evidence of
the assault
the shooting of Alvin, because, he
independent offense other than that for >vhich he was
tried. The shooting of Alvin occurred a few seconds
the defendant shot ·wilbur. Alvin and \Vilbur were
both of the same family, and the defendant had threatened
to kill the whole family. [1] 'l'hesc and other circumstances
the case elcarly show that the shooting- of Alvin was a
of the same transaction in whieh \Vilbur was
evid(•nce pertaining to it was therefore admissible.
Proc.,
1850, 1870, subd. 7; Pen. Code, § 1102; People
. O'Bryam, 165 Cal. 55, 59 [130 P. 1042];
Y.
153 Cal. 10, 12 [94 P. 92); People v. il1cClnre, 148 Cal.
P.
v.
123 Cal.
298 [55
; People Y. C1·owley, 13 CaLApp. 322, 325-326
P. 493].) Its relevancy on the issue of the defendant intent
shooting Wilbur is obvious. (People v.
2 CaL2d
277 [40 P.2d 823] ; People v. 0 'Bryan,
CaL
People v. MilLer, 121 Cal. 343
P.
111 Cal. 460 [44 P. 186]; People v
[32 P. 864].) The case of People v.
[ 34 P. 856], relied upon by the
factors here present such as the threat
was
to kill the "whole family" and the
of his threat by killing Wilbur and by
to
murder .Alvin as part of the same affray. (See People v.
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in the
other
the admission of
asserts that the court
the

as
the defendant is innocent or
crime
him in this action. You are not
to confor any other purpose.
'l'he value,
sicler that
if any, of such evidence
on whether or not it tends
to show:
) the identity of the person who committed the
crime in
in this ease, if it was committed;
or
tl1at the defendant had a motive for the commission
of the offense
him in this action ; or ( 3) that
the defendant entertained the intent which is a necessary
element of ihe alleged crime for ·which he now is on trial,
as pointed out in other of my instructions; or
that the
defendant was familiar with the means alleged to have been
nsed in the commission of the crime of which he is accused
in this action; or
) that the defendant possessed knowledge
that might have been useful in the commission of the crime
for which he is now on trial; or
that there existed in the
mind of the defendant a plan, scheme,
or
into
which fitted the commission of the offense for which he now
could
is on trial.'' '!'hereafter the court stated that the
consider the evidence for purposes ( 4) and ( 5), but could
not consider it in connection with those purposes where the
other offense involved was a ''later offense.'' The defendant's point seems to be that the People knew that the Alvin
shooting was a later offense than the killing of ·wilbur and
therefore should not have offered the instruction embracing
( 4) and
. The instruction was somewhat inconsistent, for
it said, in the listing of purposeR, that the Alvin affair could
be considered and,
that a later offense could
not be considered. If there was error, however, we fail to
see how it could have prejudiced the defendant. He admitted
on the witness stand that he fired the shot which killed ·wilbur
and that he was thoroughly familiar with the manner of
the gun,
there was no serious
at the trial with respect to the matters referred
and ( 5) of the instruction.
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(lenirrelevant and
TuE CouRT:
it
'' There was no
the

it " and
it did.'' X o further
were asked Oil
and tlw matter was dropped. lt does not appear
there 11·as any en·ot· in
the
[4] 'l he
or
of the question asked of the defendwas not apparent, and eounsel for the defendant did not
to
the purpose of the
or offer to
slio1v how an ans·wer migbt be relevant. Jn the absence of
sll<:ll a showing no prejudice appears.
v. Danielly,
Cal.2d a62, ;riG [202 P.2d 18 j ; People Y.
194 CaL
65:!
McOann, 194 CaL
6921

reason of
et! the proseto open the ease and to make the opening
argcwwut. Couusel for the defend:mt declined to argue the
on the insanity plea. aud tlJHt isi-Hle \Yas submitted to
i h•·
after
iustruetions. 'l'lw defendant claims
1 ilat. inasnnwh as he had tl1c burden of
such order
and arg:nment constitnterl error. That question
to be settled. [5] "No seetion of the Penal Code
directs the order of tlle trial npoJJ a
of not
illy b~- reason of insanity, ancl it has been
held
def(•m1allt lws no right to O]:Wl1 and c:lose the argument
the jnry (
v. Hickman (Ul2R). 204 Cal. 470, 482
P.
270 P. 11
Y Ooold (
, 215 Cal.
7GG fl2 P.2d 9G8];
v. Kimball (1936), 5 Cal.2d
611
P.2d 483]; see, also, People v. Hardy (1948),
Cal.2cl 52, 65-66 [198 P.2d 865]) although the trial court
may permit him to do so (see People v. Lee (1930), 108
On thl' trial of tlle

of not

Mr. Hobert
appeared before
reason to believe that

United States may have exclumatter.
defendant
additional evic1ence on appeal
is an Indian and that the land on which
was committed was an Indian allotment. Thereafter
filed a
signed
the proseeution alone,
re Application to Produce
It
among other
that defendant
but h,; a eitizen of California who has never been
to any restrictions on account of his race and has at
all times
all the rights and privileges of any other
that <leeedent ·wilbur McSwain was an Indian, that
letters
to the lots where the crime was committed were
issued
the United States to Maggie Jim, an Indian, that
the letters
are still held in trust by the United States
of America and that the lots have never been part of an
Indian reservation. The defendant signed and filed a separate so-called "stipulation" in which he disagreed with some
of the matters set forth in the document fileu by the People
but stated that defendant and ·wilbm McSwain were Indians,
that the
crime took place on lands allotted by the
[;nited States in trust for Maggie ,Jim, an Indian, and that
tl1e lands are still held in trust.
The briefs of the parties have presented numerous questhe
of considering a stipulations
tion of fads made on appeal, the meaning of the particular
documents filed by the parties, the construction and effect
of the
federal statutes, and the constitutionality of
such statutes if they are interpreted to vest exclusive jurisdiction over the crime in the federal government. \Ve have
concluded that the proposed offer to produce additional evidence on the appeal should be denied. Furthermore, even
that additional evidence could be received on
in this class of cases by stipulation or otherwise,
the facts stated in the so-called "stipulation" as well as
shown in the entire record are insufficient to show exclusive
jurisdiction in the federal courts.
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a .i nry !rial 1vas
Cal.2cl iJ:37, 546 219 P .2d 1 j ; see also

152-154
P.2d
at the trial is not sufficient
a determination that there is exelusive federal
in the
and we do not pass on the
of what remedies may be available to the defendant
sho1v alleged lack of jurisdiction in the state court.
tlJe record indicates that the location of the
'Indian
" ·within the
havr been cited.
and
While there was
and the victim were "
" the use of this
more, shows
that the persons
and blood. That fact is insufficient to vest in the federal
government exclusive jurisdiction over a crime committed in
, because such
does not exist when
crime inyolves Indians who have been
manner, as, for
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v.
S.Ot. 107, 41
104 u.s.
624
327 U.S.
622-623 [80 P.2d
unnecessary to the decision, to the
of the cases
with emanciwhere the defendant has committed murder or one of the other
crimes designated
in what is now section 1153 of title 18 of the United States
Code. The
Ketchum, Monroe, Howard and Irvine
cases, eited in the preceding paragraph, involved those major
crimes, and the only decision eited in the Pratt ease does not
support its statement. The language in the Pratt case must
therefore be
insofar as it is inconsistent with
the views ,v,·n·~''""wl
[11] ·The two documents entitled "stipulation," even if
the effect of a stipulation to the extent that they agree
on some of the facts, are likewise insufficient to bring this
ease within the cited statutes
to federal
diction over offenses committed
or against Indians in
Indian country. Insofar as the status of the defendant and
the stipulation adds
nothing to the evidence
at trial because
in effect,
relates
to the race and descent of these persons and
does not disclose whether
were Indians of the type
subject to federal jurisdiction or whether they were emanci[8b]
the stipulation indicates that the crime
was committed on allotment lands held in trust for an Indian
and thus may have taken place in "Indian
" (18
U.S.O. § 1151 , this alone, as we have seen, does not establish
exclusive federal jurisdiction.
since the stipu-

aud

,J. pro

J.---I coneur in the
agree that the evidence in the record
facie suffito proye that the state courts of California possess
have exerc~ised jnrisdiction over both t1Je defendant and
f~rime of which he has been
and I further agree
! lmt there is no stipulation before the court establishing facts
"11ffieient to show that the state courts of California lack ;juris' lidion eithrr in
to the defendant or the crime.
CAiiTEH. ,f.----I dtssent.
l agree IYith tbe
that "'where trial
jury IS
mattrr of
'' and a ease has been tried by a jury, an
•pcllate (~OlUt camwt recein; additional eYidrcnce 011 appeaL
It <loes not necessarily follow. lwwen:r, that an appellate eourt
,•;J.nnot consider stipulations and admissions of jurisdictional
\d1ieh arc not
of tlle reeord. Wl1ere the parties
in a stipulation of faet:s on appeal the court is not tllereby
reqnirerl to cleH>rmine fadnal mattC'r:-: bnt n:maim; strictly
wit!Jin its t·onstii utionaJ
of
"cp1estions
qf Jaw alone." Althoug·h a number of eases, both in Cali-

fomia ;md other jnrisdietion,, have considered the question
<!!'stipulations and admissions of fad on appeal, 110 ease has
liet•n found that nde11L!aiely (liscnsses this
The ('!os('st California ease is People \'.
176 Cal.
():). 107 11fi7 P. 6D6]. which im·o!Yed an appeal from a coll\'lc,tion of murder where the death
was imposed.
~-Assigned

by Chairman of Judicial Council.

C.2d

in the interests of
After
section 4 of
p. 107
in such
for the purpose of
the deterto whether there has been any error
of the trial court. \Y e have no
and may
determine no
find no substantial enor of law, we
of the ](rwer eourt. It is dear, too,
eonsilleration of sueh an appeal for this limited
confined to the record sent to us from the
ignores the prineiple, noted
in a stipulation of facts
.,.,.~nn•c•rl to determine facmatters but remains strictly within its constitutional
of
"questions of law alone." Moreover,
in the wording of article VI, section 4, which
an appellate court to be ''confined to
the rrcon1" in the sense that it cannot look at stipulations
and admissions of faets outside the record of the trial court.
other California case that appears to be in point
is
v.
121
345, 347-348 [8 P.2d 920].
There the court held that "the statements of counsel and the
in their briefs for the
purpose of
the omissions in the record'' could not
be considered to establish who requested a particular instruction which defendant attacked on appeal. The appellate
"'"U"'-'''"va of District Courts of Appeal in criminal cases,
like that o£ this
is limited to determination of '' questions of
alone'' ( Const., art.
§ 4b), and the opinion,
as
case, does not discuss the possibility that
use of sueh statements and admissions is proper under
court constitutional powers.
the authorities
eited
the court in the Mesa case do not support its conthe cases are in conflict as to whether
or admissions on appeal as to matters not in
the record can be considered. Some cases hold that they
will be considered. (State v. Goodager, 56 Ore. 198 [108 P.

evidence to show
California and asserts

that a crime was committed ·within a certain
it failed to
that the
subject
People v.
P.2d 84] .)
it would seem
stipulation
is exclusive
a matter
facts
XOUcHJl.J.Vi.HU

m
waived any objection
trial on such facts.
a
vvhere the essential facts can be
settled by stipulation of the parties, and where all questions
law can be determined on the appeal, it would seem un43 C.2d-12
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C.2d
go
the motions
such as habeas corpus.
Constitution which prethe
of the parties, and
and should do so in the present

case.
As
now argues
that'
tua.c>vu of facts.''
Each
and the
a
two documents arc different in substance and language with
""'oYH>nr to
items.
of course, are contracts
upon the terms of which the
must come to an agreement.
Sec 23 CaLJur. 822.) Attached to the document
offered
the
is a copy of a letter to defendant's counsel stating that "this is as far as we can go
in any
of facts'' and that if defendant had any
objection to ''any of the facts appearing in the stipulation
or if you
in the stipulation we would appreciate it if
you would advise the court in the premises.'' This letter
seerns to have left it open for defendant to accept or reject
the People's
in whole or in part. The defendant's
stipulation was in response to that of the People and agreed
with some items but expressly rejected others. Accordingly,
I will proceed upon the theory that the parties have made a
stipulation with respect to all matters as to which the two
documents are substantially in accord.
It is stated in each document that defendant is an Indian,
but this must be
to refer only to his race and
blood because the People qualified their stipulation with the
statement that defendant has never been subject to any restrictions on account of his race and has at all times enjoyed
all rights and privileges of any other citizen of California.
Both documents state that ·wilbur Dan McSwain, the victim,
"was an
" but, unlike the statement relating to defendant, no qualification is made by the People with respect
to the status of McSwain. For this reason we should probably
treat McSwain as an ''Indian'' not only as far as race and
descent are concerned but also for the purposes of the federal
statutes which use the word "Indian." Some indication of
the intent of the parties in using the word ''Indian'' may be
derived from the fact that the documents submitted by both
parties were entitled "stipulation [regarding] application to
produce evidence,'' since the ''application'' which is thus referred to clearly indicates that the word "Indian" was there

355
It was
on certain deof the Sierra

should
and courts exelusive control and that the
federal power over Indians is outmoded.
ihis connection, that exclusive federal
1s mcon~which prosistent with federal
that all Indians born
States are citizens.
On behalf of
contended ihat the state
over him in that exclusive
in such cases i:s \'Csted in the United States and
courts by reason of sections
1133 and 3242 of
United States Code
1949.
title
Section 1151
as otherwise protitle
sections
dr1ed in sections 1154
to Indians and the definition
omrnt•·"' as
relates to the
laws]'
. ' as used in this
means (a)
limits of
reservation under
notwith-
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comcommits
or other

intent to
assault with a
robbery, and
on and within
shall be tried in the same
and
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citizen of the
for that reason, our
That contention was answered adUnited .States
241 U.S. 591
598):

'l'he status of Indians as citizens seems immaterial in de~,'"~""'"'"' whether the federal
has exclusive jurisdiction over offenses in Indian
In 1924 Congress
that all Indians born in the United States are citizens
the United States.
U.S.C.A.. §
8 U.S.C.A..
3.)
all such Indians are citizens of the state
which
A.mdt.
It has been
m
cases that the
Indians does not mean that
federal

born in this
was not intended to amount to an indirect wholesale abandonment of federal
particularly
in view of the many federal statutes upon Indians which
were left unchanged, and it would be more reasonable to ex-
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would

S.Ct.
,
was an Omaha Indian
Nebraska.
citizen of the United States
and of the
in
He contended at the
trial that the state
The Supreme
Court held that the
and said:
''
he
States had not
with the title
to the
but still held them in trust for the Indians. In
that situation
power
make rules and regulations re"IJ'C'-'"-'""' such
was ample.''
It is contended
the People that this state had jurisdiction
in that it had never ceded jurisdiction over the land on which
the crime occurred. In United States v. McGowan, 302 U.S.
535
S.Ct.
82 L.Ed. 410], it was held that the principle
of exclusive federal
over crimes involving Indians
on Indian reservations is not based on a cession of such
jurisdiction by the states to the federal government but is
based on the constitutional authority of the United States to
deal with the Indians. It is argued by the People that whether
the defendant was a ward of the United States (as held in
United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 [6 S.Ct. 1109, 30
L.Ed. 228]) was a question of fact which should have been
raised at one of defendant's two trials, and that the burden
was on defendant to prove such wardship, or jurisdiction, as
a defense. In United States v. Rogers, 23 F. 658, it was held
that the matter of
in a criminal proceeding is
never presumed; that it must always be proved and is never
waived as a defense. It was further held there that the question of jurisdiction can be raised at any stage of the proceeding. (See also United States v. Anderson, 60 F.Supp.
649, 650,
that if the court is without jurisdiction of
the subject matter, its proceeding is a nullity.) "Even the
consent of the accused cannot confer jurisdiction, and it is
an issue that can be made at any stage of the proceedings,
. . . " In Costa v. Banta
civil case), 98 Cal.A.pp.2d 181,
182 [219 P.2d
, it was held that "Although the jurisdiction of that court was not questioned during the trial, it
is well established that questions of jurisdiction are never
waived and may be raised for the first time on appeal.'' In
State v. Pepion (1951), 125 Mont. 13 [230 P.2d 961], the defendant, an Indian, committed larceny within the limits of
an Indian reservation. The court held that he was subject
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federal laws and was under the exclusive
diction of the United States courts. It was there held that
the state district court was without
and that its
was a
contend that section 1153 extended the definition
Indian
for the first
time in 1948
that in order to
exclusive
the United States
such Indian allottees must
Indian title" to the land. By
it is
is meant that the Indians
under
such an allotment must have had an '
use and
occupancy or to
land which
a statutorily
Indian reservation." The crime occurred in 1950,
and a complete answer to this
is that the sections
under consideration do not so provide. Nothing is to be
found therein providing that Indian allotments must have
once been part of an Indian reservation. The
contend
that the sections were amended to cover Indian allotments
after the decision in United States v. Pelican, 232 U.S. 442,
449 [34 S.Ct. 396, 58 L.Ed. 676], wherein it was held that
land once part of an Indian reservation did not lose its character as Indian country by reason of a subsequent allotment
to Indians. It was there held: "But, meanwhile, the lands
remained Indian lanlis set
for Indians under governmental care; and we are unable to find ground for the conelusion that they become other than Indian
through
the distribution into separate
the Government retaining control." It would appear that the Pelican decision
adds nothing to the People's argument and serves merely to
establish that the statute was amended so as to cover, specifically, Indian allotments.
v. United
186 F.2d
93, relied upon by the People is not in point here. That case
involved the murder of an Indian by an Indian in 1942.
At that time section 1151 did not include Indian allotments
The court there
said: ''But, judging federal
of the statute when the offense was
we are now
constrained to hold that when the reservation was dissolved
and tribal government broken up, the allotted lands lost their
character as lands 'within any Indian reservation'." The
court there noted that it was not alleged that either Indian
involved
the status of an allottee of lands the title
to which wa:s held in trust
the United States and that

360

PEOPLE

v.

CARMEN

[43 C.2d

had not seen fit to so
made
the
is that this state
ll'icuet1vu with the United States. Since the
that the United States has exa
the contention 1s

LelJLtw>u

without
Inasmuch
to
the
information

and
therefore
the trial court to dismiss the

